The digital divide in the post-Snowden era by Clark, I. & Clark, I.
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1Introduction
In late 2012/early 2013, Edward Snowden, a contractor working for the National Security 
Agency (NSA), approached two journalists with information about a programme of mass 
surveillance conducted by the US government (Carmon, 2013). The NSA’s security 
operations were designed to collect vast amounts of data regarding the internet use of 
everyone online. Furthermore, the revelations of surveillance operations suggested a 
relationship between the state and large corporations (MacAskill, 2013).
His realisation of the extent of the surveillance of the American population (and beyond) 
prompted Snowden to approach Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald with information about 
the programmes being conducted (Maass, 2013). These revelations have forced us to 
confront the reality of the internet. Despite the technology's potential to broaden engagement
in the democratic process, it has been increasingly utilised as a tool to manage and direct 
populations (Lyon, 2015). State and commercial surveillance has grown to such an extent, 
that its operation is comparable to that adopted by totalitarian states (Giroux, 2015). Rather 
than strengthening democracy, increased access to the internet has instead resulted in the 
ascendency of surveillance infrastructures which are ultimately incompatible with liberal 
democratic systems of governance (Cohen, 2013). As a profession that has developed many 
of the “norms of intellectual freedom and privacy” (Richards, 2008), librarianship should be 
concerned about a programme of mass surveillance that threatens intellectual freedom and 
privacy (the freedom to read, think and speak).
Since the emergence of the internet, librarians have been concerned with the consequences 
of the “digital divide” – the gap between those with meaningful access to the internet, and 
those without (DiMaggio & Hargittai, 2001). But the “digital divide” should not be 
considered purely in terms of access, it also needs to be understood in terms of skills – the 
divide between those who can exploit the internet to their advantage, and those that cannot. 
In the post-Snowden digital landscape there is an additional element to this skills divide to 
consider – the divide between those who can navigate the internet free from state and 
corporate oversight, and those who cannot. Although there have been studies in the United 
States on the ability of different social groups to protect themselves from unwarranted online
surveillance (Park, 2013), there has been little significant analysis of online privacy and the 
digital divide in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the study of digital inclusion has rarely 
factored in issues related to surveillance and privacy (Gangadharan, 2012). 
This paper explores the implications of privacy and surveillance technologies regarding 
digital inclusion in the UK. It examines online surveillance, the usability of encryption tools 
designed to protect intellectual privacy online, the state of the digital divide, and the role of 
library and information professionals in this area.
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2The digital divide
Initial conceptions of the digital divide primarily focused on access to the internet, 
particularly in terms of whether an individual did or did not go online (Hargittai, 2002). As 
access has grown, so has focus shifted away from whether or not an individual has access to 
an internet connection and towards how they actually use it (Hargittai, 2002; Park, 2014; 
Sparks, 2013). In particular, there has been growing interest in the impact of the internet on 
the “political behaviour of citizens” (De Marco, Robles, & Antino, 2014). Despite growing 
access to the internet, the evidence suggests that rather than broader engagement, political 
discourse continues to be dominated by elite groups with the digital skills divide 
exacerbating the democratic deficit (Hargittai, 2002; Mervyn, Simon, & Allen, 2014; Min, 
2010; Sparks, 2013). 
DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001) identified five key dimensions along which such a divide 
might exist: technical means (hardware and connections), social support networks available 
to users, skill in using the internet, their purposes in using the technology, and autonomy of 
use (whether use is monitored or unmonitored). As Gangadharan (2012) observed before 
Edward Snowden disclosed the activities of the NSA, the study of digital inclusion with 
regards to privacy and surveillance has received little attention. In the light of Snowden’s 
disclosures therefore, it is increasingly important to consider the impact of surveillance upon 
those connected to the internet and, in particular, to examine the extent to which citizens can
exhibit autonomy in their use of it as a consequence of these conditions.
In terms of digital inclusion more generally, Fuchs (2010) observes that people with high 
income, good education, and high skills are more likely to have access to the internet and to 
be highly capable using it compared to those endowed with very little economic (ability to 
purchase equipment), social (a networking of skilled support and contacts), or cultural 
capital (ability to invest time to improve skills). All such manifestations of capital are 
fundamental factors in the extent to which people are able to ensure autonomy of internet 
use. There is a need to purchase the equipment that offers the best security, the need to 
invest time to develop skills to use encryption technologies effectively and access to a 
network of skilled, knowledgeable contacts to ensure guidance on using the technology 
effectively. Before exploring the skills and knowledge required to ensure privacy and enable 
citizens to exhibit autonomy in their use of the internet, we must understand how 
surveillance operates and the conditions of the surveillance society that we inhabit.
Justifying surveillance as a security strategy
State surveillance is not a recent development in terms of the management and control of 
individuals, however the events of September 11th 2001 led to a substantial expansion of 
surveillance, deepening a culture of fear and suspicion (Fuchs, 2010). Surveillance has 
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expanded to such an extent that although it is not ubiquitous, its presence has become 
normalised and is a generally accepted part of modern living (Fuchs, 2010; Giroux, 2015). 
Part of this extensive expansion of surveillance is a consequence of the increased use of 
digital communication technologies by terrorist organisations. Whereas organisations such as
ETA and the IRA relied on word of mouth or the media to distribute attack warnings, 
terrorist groups now utilise the internet to disseminate propaganda, communicating directly 
with supporters and potential converts (Brown & Korff, 2009). 
Proponents of surveillance as a security strategy argue that the use of public and private 
surveillance leads to greater security from crime and terrorism (Richards, 2013) and that its 
use enables European states to meet their obligation to protect their populations against 
possible terrorist acts (Council of Europe, 2002). In the UK, Osman v United Kingdom also 
reinforced this obligation, but further advised that there is an imperative to respect the 
guarantees contained within Articles 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(European Court of Human Rights, 1998). Article 8 guarantees the right for the respect of 
an individual’s private life and specifically entrenches the data protection rights of citizens 
(Brown & Korff, 2009). It is also subject to a robust interpretation by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) to ensure government surveillance is restricted (Brown, 2014). 
There is, therefore, a tension between the need to protect the individual from supposed 
external threats and the right of the individual to a private life – surveillance corrodes civil 
liberties, but it also manages threats (Richards, 2013).
The act of surveillance
Although there are justifications for the use of targeted surveillance, the implementation of 
mass surveillance raises serious concerns. Michel Foucault’s interpretation of Jeremy 
Bentham’s panopticon is often used as a starting point when seeking to understand the 
impact of surveillance on the individual (Lyon, 1994). Bentham proposed the design of a 
prison with a central tower that would enable supervisors to view all the cells at any one time
without the prisoners being able to see them (Bentham, 1995). Foucault used Bentham’s idea
as an example of “the automatic functioning of power”, arguing that surveillance is most 
effective when it is permanent in its effects, even if not continuous in its actions (Foucault, 
1977). For Foucault, effective power must be both “visible” and “unverifiable”. Those subject
to surveillance must be able to see, or be conscious of, the mechanisms used to monitor 
them, yet also unable to determine whether they are being monitored at any one moment. 
Ultimately, surveillance is at its most effective when it does not require the actual exercising 
of power, the individual is controlled due to the awareness that they may be observed. It 
manages and controls individuals, and therefore undermines autonomy (Lynch, 2015), on the
basis of existing, rather than by acting.
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The concept of surveillance as a technique to both protect and influence the individual is 
taken up by David Lyon, a leading figure in surveillance studies, who outlined his definition 
of surveillance as being the “focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for 
purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon, 2007). Surveillance is 
not merely concerned with observing individuals on the basis of protecting them it is also 
about managing and directing those that are under surveillance, undermining their 
autonomy. It is as much about direction as it is about protection (Lyon, 2007). This is 
particularly troubling with respect to mass surveillance as we are not just observing the 
actions and behaviours of a minority, everyone is subject to management or direction. The 
unchecked expansion of such surveillance structures ultimately undermines individual 
liberties and fundamentally threatens the notion of liberal democracy (Cohen, 2013).
Surveillance, the state, and the individual
Surveillance inhibits our ability to formulate new, alternative ideas in relation to political and
social issues because the spaces available to formulate such ideas are subject to state 
oversight (Richards, 2013). Recent revelations have demonstrated the extent to which these 
safe spaces to discuss alternative ideas to the status quo have been violated with pro-
democracy movements such as Occupy and others undermined by the use of state 
surveillance (Giroux, 2015). Richards argues that this tactic is a threat to “intellectual 
privacy” – the notion that “new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of 
public exposure” and that a guarantee of protection from surveillance or interferences is 
necessary to protect such freedom (Richards, 2013). Intellectual privacy is an essential form 
of privacy for all. It enables everyone to explore and develop new ideas, free from the gaze 
of state or corporate interests, enabling the contemplation and exploration of alternatives to 
the status quo.
Violations of an individual’s intellectual privacy by the state seeking to learn what people are
reading, watching, thinking, or saying are serious threats to civil liberty. This is a key and 
vital area for librarians to engage in, not least because the profession has arguably developed 
“many of the most important norms of intellectual freedom and privacy” (Richards, 2008). 
To develop ideas, space must be available to explore and experiment with them, to adapt 
them knowing that we are doing so in private. Ultimately, surveillance can undermine our 
freedom of thought and skew the way we think, with clear consequences for the content of 
our speech or writing (Richards, 2008). This understanding of surveillance as an intellectual 
inhibitor is not historically controversial. In 1967, for example, the Presidential Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recognised that the fear of being 
monitored can have “a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and 
constructive ideas” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, 1967).
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Mass surveillance by the state results in the chilling effect of limiting our intellectual privacy,
inhibiting our ability to seek out new ideas that conflict with the status quo and therefore 
inhibiting our autonomy. This freedom to seek out new ideas, critique and dissent from the 
status quo is an essential element of the democratic process (Bauman, 2001; Giroux, 2015). 
For a democracy to function effectively, privacy of communications are essential to ensure 
that individuals have the space afforded them to think and engage constructively in the 
democratic process (Richards, 2008). As the balance between our safety and our civil 
liberties shifts, as the barriers to authoritarian power erode, so the ability to think critically 
becomes a dangerous act (Giroux, 2015). The ability to develop critical perspectives on the 
world in private is central to a functional democratic system and efforts by the state to use 
surveillance as a tool of control ensure that challenges to the status quo are contained 
(Bauman, 2001; Cohen, 2013; Giroux, 2015). Consequently, those who aren’t served by the 
existing system, whether marginalised by income, gender, race, sexuality, or disability, will 
be inhibited from effectively critiquing and challenging the system, ensuring it is more 
responsive to the policy preferences of those that benefit from the status quo – typically the 
wealthiest in society (Morris & Morris, 2013). As a result, the ability to limit unwarranted 
surveillance is critical in ensuring and sustaining a fully functioning democratic system 
(Castells, 2004).
Surveillance and capitalism
Although surveillance is traditionally viewed as a mechanism of the state, it is also important
to be conscious of the growth of corporate surveillance. The two forms of surveillance may 
appear distinct, but the two increasingly interact with information flowing between them in a 
state of “liquid surveillance” (Richards, 2013). Liquid surveillance has emerged as a 
consequence of the gradual shift in reducing ordinary citizens to consumers and 
transforming them into suspects, enabling personal data to flow as if a liquid (Lyon, 2010). 
Corporate surveillance can no longer be seen as a separate phenomenon. Indeed, co-
operation between the state and business in collecting information on those that threaten the 
status quo is not a recent phenomenon, particularly in the UK (Smith & Chamberlain, 
2015). The data collected by corporations is not simply sold to advertisers to make profits, 
remaining solely within the corporate domain, but, as Snowden’s disclosures revealed, it is 
also accessed by the state (MacAskill, 2013).
Private companies generate profits from the commodification of personal data, collecting 
and selling in return for using “free” services (Richards, 2013). The rapid commercialisation 
of the internet from 1995 onwards was crucial in consolidating the notion that information is
a commodity (Lyon, 2015). Increasingly our personal data has become a commodity for 
large corporations to derive profit. Global capitalism is reliant on the creation and 
consolidation of profit for global corporations. As a result, the commodification of 
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information compels global corporations to rapaciously harvest data to drive up profits. 
Encouraging the desire to surrender personal data is, ultimately, fundamental to the growth 
and consolidation of many such corporations. As such, whereas the state has previously been
persuaded to reject certain surveillance techniques (Price, 2013), it is hard to see corporate 
entities permitting a retreat from a strategy that drives profit.
Although many online services are free to use, some of the largest are funded by 
advertisements that are driven by user data – the more data they accrue about online activity 
the more effectively these adverts can be targeted (Fuchs, 2010; Richards, 2013). The use of 
transactional data, profile, financial status, etc., is fundamental to the marketing strategies for
online businesses and is growing as more sources of personal data emerge (Evans, 2005). 
For example, security firm AVG sell search and browser data to advertisers in order to 
“make money” from its free antivirus software (Temperton, 2015a). Through use of the 
service, individuals receive free security software in return for their personal data being 
collected and sold to generate profit. 
The volume of personal data has expanded principally as a result of the emergence of social 
media, which has opened up new methods of communication and facilitated the harvesting 
of personal data for large corporations. Social media platforms are increasingly tracking, 
surveilling, and connecting individuals to others, undermining efforts by users to maintain 
their privacy (Vickery, 2014). This form of surveillance is different from that conducted by 
the state because it appears to be consensual. Users are neither monitored covertly nor is 
their data extracted without their knowledge, it is given away voluntarily. Rather than a 
panopticon that is imposed without consent, social media users engage in a “voluntary 
panopticon” (Humphreys, 2011). This voluntary panopticon results in the surrendering of 
personal data to benefit the user, whether for discounted services or for enhancing social 
status (Cohen, 2013; Giroux, 2015). As part of the neoliberal drive to turn citizens into 
consumers, social media plays an important role in making all aspects of life visible and 
subject to market forces (Giroux, 2015).
However, concerns regarding the security of personal data being held by organisations were 
reflected in a report by Deloitte which found that 24% of people in the UK do not trust any 
type of organisation with their personal data (Deloitte Insight, 2014). These concerns are 
particularly prevalent in the young. A report by Demos (also in the UK) found that 18–25 
year olds cared more about online privacy than issues such as the environment, crime, and 
welfare (Birdwell, Cadywould, & Reynolds, 2015). Although many are willing to trade 
personal data for free services, a significant proportion are concerned about online privacy 
and suspicious about the storage of personal data. For those that are concerned, there is 
clearly a need to help them act on these concerns and minimise their exposure to the 
collection of their personal data. 
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This willingness to trade personal data for free services has prompted technologists such as 
Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist at the American Civil Liberties Union, to argue
the need for individuals to “rethink their relationship” with many corporations and 
understand that if they want a secure service they will need to “pay something so the 
company has a sustainable business model that doesn’t depend on (collecting and monetizing
your data)” (Bloom, 2014). The use of free online services is ultimately a threat to online 
privacy as the collection of personal data is fundamental to the economic model. In a 
capitalist society, where money is exchanged for the products of someone’s labour, the 
façade of a product accessible at no cost to the user may be difficult to overcome. 
State and corporate collaboration
The data that is collected by communications companies in return for services does not 
always stay securely in their possession. In the United States, for example, records collected 
by corporations can be obtained by the government through a variety of means, including 
grand jury subpoenas or through National Security Letters (NSLs) that enable the FBI to 
obtain information from telephone companies, ISPs, etc. (McLaughlin, 2015; Richards, 
2013). The extent of the blurring between state and corporate communications is such that 
concerns about the collection of personal data have led to legal actions, such as that launched
by the Belgian privacy commission against Facebook for allegedly conducting surveillance 
comparable to the NSA (Gibbs, 2015a). Increasingly, corporate data collection is effectively 
state surveillance by proxy as data flows between the two in a process of “liquid 
surveillance”. Consequently, services such as Facebook have become “a major clearinghouse
for serious and systematic surveillance by corporations, crime control agencies and...security 
concerns” (Lyon, 2010).
The relationship between corporations and the state has strengthened with respect to 
surveillance and data gathering. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, was 
influenced by “Customer Relationship Management” (CRM) as part of the drive towards 
“Total Information Awareness” (Lyon, 2015). New technologies to expand surveillance have 
also been developed by the corporations and sold to the government, including facial 
recognition software developed by The Disney Corporation and sold to the US military 
(Wolf, 2012). The depth of this relationship is further demonstrated by the Pentagon’s 
appointment of the CEO of Google’s parent company to lead its Defense Innovation 
Advisory Board, which will influence “product development … [and] data analysis” (Shalal, 
2016). Clearly, government and corporations are increasingly connecting, sharing 
information and facilitating the development of surveillance technologies such that it is 
creating a “brand-new domain of the state-corporate complex” (Schell, 2013) which has led 
to the further development of a surveillance culture (Lyon, 2015). State and corporate 
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apparatuses have, effectively, colluded to induct everyone into a regime of both security and 
commodification (Giroux, 2015). 
The emergence of digital surveillance
Variations of the practices uncovered by Snowden are well established techniques practised 
both by the state and corporate sectors, not just in terms of state surveillance, but also in 
terms of consumer marketing (Lyon, 2015). Throughout the 1980s, researchers were 
interested in both state surveillance in relation to national security, and in terms of consumer
surveillance – the latter only seriously considered as surveillance in the 1990s (Lyon, 2015). 
Even during this period, before mass adoption of the internet, the impact that 
computerisation would have on these forms of surveillance had been identified and 
understood (Lyon, 2015).
Surveillance strategies have historically been a fundamental strategy of the state to manage 
their populations, undermining autonomy. Under the pretext of national security concerns, 
the state has consistently violated civil liberties through the use of surveillance. From the 
counter-terrorism programme developed by J. Edgar Hoover in the 1950s that remained in 
place until the 1970s (Giroux, 2015), to the surveillance conducted by the US Army 
following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr (Richards, 2013), the strategy is not a 
new one. As recently as the 1990s, the ECHELON system enabled the Five Eyes (the 
intelligence sharing partnership between the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) 
to intercept all satellite communications, allowing access to cable and radio communications 
worldwide (Jordan, 2015). 
Surveillance has often been used as a strategy to contain the poorest and the most 
marginalised members of society, particularly on the basis of the suppression of working 
people’s resistance and the containment of “alleged social contagion” (Eubanks, 2011). This 
was demonstrated in the United Kingdom where, at the beginning of the 20th century, 
agents of the state covertly photographed members of the suffragette movement on the basis 
that the movement presented a serious “threat to the British Empire” (Casciani, 2003; Smith 
& Chamberlain, 2015). This use of surveillance to contain and suppress a marginalised 
group campaigning for equal rights in British society demonstrated the extent to which the 
government was prepared to defend the status quo, limiting engagement in the democratic 
process. For the security services, there is an unambiguous desire to monitor those who wish
to “prevent something happening or to change legislation to domestic policy” (Evans & 
Lewis, 2013). 
Digital surveillance in the United Kingdom
The UK government has remained one of the leading proponents of surveillance, to the 
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extent that the United Kingdom is considered one of the most surveilled democratic states 
(Richards, 2013). In 2008 the UK government launched a mass digital surveillance 
programme (code-named KARMA POLICE) without public debate or scrutiny. The goal of
the program was to record the browsing habits of “every visible user on the internet” 
(Gallagher, 2015). The data collected included access to news websites, social media, search 
engines, and chat forums amongst others, violating the intellectual privacy of those unable to
protect themselves. This was followed in 2013 by The Guardian’s revelations about GCHQ’s 
Tempora program. As a result of the placement of data interceptors on cables carrying data 
between Europe and America, the Tempora program allowed the agency to analyse 
communications, including the content of email messages, Facebook posts and recordings of
phone calls (Jordan, 2015; MacAskill et al., 2013). Such activities raise serious concerns for 
librarianship as a profession concerned with intellectual freedom and privacy: particularly in 
terms of how we can protect the privacy of our users and ensure their autonomy when 
accessing the internet, particularly in the UK.
Furthermore, both the UK and the US have been at odds with European institutions 
regarding the collection and use of personal data. The Safe Harbour agreement, for example,
permits the safe transfer of personal data to the US without being misused in line with 
European Data Protection law, however this has not insulated the data from acquisition by 
the NSA (Bernal, 2015; European Court of Justice, 2015; McGarr, 2015; Peers, 2015). A 
judgement by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regarding the storage of data 
relating to the private life of an individual has repeatedly been contested by the UK, arguing 
that use rather than collection contravenes Article 8 (Brown, 2011; European Court of 
Human Rights, 2000). Despite the UK’s protests, the European Court has comprehensively 
rejected the view that the collection of data does not affect privacy rights (European Court of
Human Rights, 2008). 
Despite concerns across Europe, however, the UK remains relatively aggressive in its use of 
surveillance technologies, regardless of rulings by the ECHR. In 2015, for example, the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) revealed that GCHQ (Government Communications 
Headquarters) had spied on two international human rights organisations and confirmed that 
the “Wilson Doctrine” (an agreement that protects parliamentarians from surveillance and 
therefore ensures confidentiality between elected representatives and the people they 
represent) was not “legally enforceable” (The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2015a, 2015b). 
Furthermore, the IPT also ruled that it is legal for GCHQ to hack into systems in the UK 
and overseas to install spyware (Moody, 2016; The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2016) and
the UK government has also sought to be able to serve wiretap notices on communications 
firms in the United States with regards to the activities of British citizens (Moody, 2016; 
Nakashima & Peterson, 2016).
Journal of Radical Librarianship, 2 (2016) pp.1–32
10
The UK government has also repeatedly attempted to pass a Draft Communications Data 
Bill (or “Snoopers Charter”) into law (Home Office, 2012) to monitor online 
communications. The Bill intended to compel technology and telecoms companies to collect 
and store metadata for up to a year and make it available to authorities without a warrant 
(Temperton, 2015b). These proposals have subsequently been revised and renamed as the 
Investigatory Powers Bill (Home Office, 2016b). The bill proposes that internet connection 
records (ICRs) must be retained by the communication service providers (CSPs) “when 
served with a notice requiring them to”, in effect ensuring access to a record of the “services 
that they have connected to” (Home Office, 2015, 2016b). This has clear implications for 
library services (including public and academic libraries) and the profession in general as the
draft legislation would require libraries to store internet usage data and pass to the state as 
required, threatening the autonomy of our users (Travis, 2016). The bill itself has been 
criticised by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy (Cannataci, 
2016) and it is not clear at present to what extent the ECHR ruling in the case of Zakharov v
Russia outlawing mass surveillance will impact its progress into law (European Court of 
Human Rights, 2015; St Vincent, 2016).
Encryption technologies are vital in protecting intellectual privacy and ensuring autonomy of
internet use, one of the five forms of digital inequality identified by DiMaggio and Hargittai 
(2001). They can also play a key role in protecting the reading habits of library users. 
However, the UK government appears hostile to encryption, with Prime Minister David 
Cameron arguing that the government should not “allow a means of communication between
people which ... we cannot read” (Mason, 2015). As a result of this, it has been suggested 
that the government may seek to secure backdoors to encrypted services (Temperton, 
2015c), undermining the intellectual privacy of all internet users. The Investigatory Powers 
Bill currently under consideration includes an obligation upon CSPs to “remove any 
encryption applied by the CSP to whom the notice relates” (Home Office, 2016a). 
Furthermore, the legislation indicates that such an obligation will only apply to “electronic 
protections that have been applied by, or on behalf of, the company on whom the obligation 
has been placed” (Home Office, 2016a). As some companies in the technology industry 
move towards strong encryption (or “electronic protections”) that they themselves cannot 
break and therefore do not control (Bernal, 2016), this raises questions about the extent to 
which encryption technologies are vulnerable to such demands by the Home Office. 
However, the British public, who largely oppose the operations conducted by the NSA (Pew 
Research Center, 2014), do not share this hostility – 43% oppose a “ban” on “encryption 
software” (YouGov, 2015).
Despite concerns about the extent to which encryption technologies are utilised by terrorists 
to evade intelligence agencies, the use of such technologies appears to be no more common 
amongst terrorists than the general population (Brown & Korff, 2009). Although the CIA 
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have raised concerns regarding the use of encryption technologies following Snowden’s 
disclosures (Brennan et al., 2015), a 2014 report by Flashpoint found that there had been 
little evidence to suggest that jihadist groups were increasingly using the technology 
(Flashpoint Partners, 2014). Furthermore, a report by Harvard's Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society questioned the extent to which encryption impedes intelligence 
gathering on criminal activity and underlined the importance for corporations of being able 
to monetise data, noting that the technology is unlikely to be “adopted ubiquitously by 
companies, because the majority of businesses … rely on access to user data for revenue” 
(Olsen et al., 2016).
Whilst the government threatens to eliminate encrypted communications, its availability 
enables those that have the skills and knowledge to defend their intellectual privacy in the 
face of a government hostile to such a principle. For those that lack skills and knowledge 
however, there is a clear threat to their intellectual privacy, exposing them to risk of greater 
surveillance and, consequently, limiting their ability to engage fully in the democratic 
process. As DiMaggio and Hargittai observe, autonomy of use of the internet must be 
considered a key component of the digital divide (DiMaggio & Hargittai, 2001). Without the
freedom that encryption technologies provide in an environment of mass surveillance 
(Reiman, 1996; Rogaway, 2015), one clearly cannot exercise such autonomy. As the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression concluded in their 2015 report, 
“encryption and anonymity enable individuals to exercise their rights to freedom of opinion 
and expression in the digital age” (Kaye, 2015). Library and information workers must, 
therefore, consider the lack of skills to protect online intellectual privacy as a key aspect of 
the digital divide and, as a profession, seek ways to overcome this aspect of digital 
inequality.
Protecting intellectual privacy through encryption
Given the effects of mass surveillance, being able to defend individual intellectual privacy 
and ensure autonomy with respect to internet usage is crucial in ensuring information can be 
accessed freely and citizens are able to seek out ideas that challenge the status quo. If only 
certain sections of society are able to protect their intellectual privacy online, to seek out 
ideas that challenge the status quo, the democratic potential of the internet will be seriously 
undermined (Min, 2010). Without the ability to freely seek out ideas that challenge the 
status quo, to organise and resist, then clearly the status quo will prevail. Access to online 
tools that ensure the protection of intellectual privacy are therefore crucial for tackling this 
aspect of digital inequality, enabling the potential for broader democratic engagement. 
Online tools that provide end-to-end (E2E) encryption are vital in ensuring freedom of 
speech and the protection of intellectual privacy (Reiman, 1996; Rogaway, 2015; Vagle, 
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2015). Although encryption does not typically protect metadata (email addresses, mobile 
phone location data), it does protect the content of what is encrypted (Cox, 2016; grugq, 
2015b; Olsen et al., 2016). Post-Snowden, there has been growing interest in the use of such 
tools and a growing number of tools that seek to take advantage of concerns regarding 
surveillance. There has, for example, been a growth in instant messaging apps that offer 
encrypted communications, such as Telegram, Whatsapp, and Signal (formerly TextSecure) 
(Dredge, 2014). Although there has been growth in instant messaging tools that facilitate 
encrypted communications, Snowden’s disclosures haven’t had a comparable impact on other
encryption tools such as PGP email encryption technologies (Renaud et al., 2014). 
Given the supposed role of the library profession in developing the norms of intellectual 
privacy, the ability to seek information online without fear of being observed must be 
considered crucial in protecting intellectual privacy and enabling autonomy of internet use. 
In an environment of mass surveillance of web activity (by both the state and corporations) 
the protection of such activity is fundamental in ensuring intellectual privacy. One of the 
most popular tools to protect web activity is Tor Browser. Tor passes web traffic through a 
series of nodes to obfuscate its source and Tor Browser is considered an effective tool to 
ensure anonymity when accessing the internet (Norcie et al., 2014; Schriner, 2015). Due to 
the nature of its operation, it is impossible to precisely determine how many people use the 
Tor network, but as of December 2015 there were an estimated two million “directly-
connecting clients” (Tor Metrics, 2015).
Tor may be effective in preventing third parties from observing and collecting data about a 
user’s web activity, but it is still susceptible to threats including “subversion via control of 
malicious nodes and timing attacks” and attempted deanonymisation of users (arma, 2014; 
Norcie et al., 2014). As with all online tools, the Tor network has its vulnerabilities and it is 
important to be clear of its limitations as well as acknowledging that it offers significantly 
greater protection than the more commonly used tools that currently exist. However, the 
biggest issue for Tor is the amount of users utilising the software – the more that use it, the 
more effective it becomes, further increasing the anonymity of its users (Norcie et al., 2014).
Fundamental to increased security through anonymity, therefore, is ensuring that online 
anonymity tools are easily usable, enabling more to use it effectively and consequently 
improve the privacy of the entire network as well as ensuring wider defence of intellectual 
privacy (Norcie et al., 2014).
In terms of the usability of security software, a different standard of usability needs to be 
applied in comparison to standard software (Whitten & Tygar, 1999). In order for the 
software to be used effectively, it is vital to ensure that those who are expected to use it:
 Are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform.
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 Are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks.
 Don’t make dangerous errors.
 Are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it (Whitten & 
Tygar, 1999).
If users experience difficulties with any of these elements, individuals will not be able to use 
the software effectively, putting themselves at risk. Ultimately, the lack of usability could 
result in “censorship, surveillance and...physical harm” (Norcie et al., 2014). 
Regarding the usability of Tor Browser, Norcie et al. (2014) found that, in the first of the 
two groups they studied, significant numbers of students experienced difficulties, even 
though they were “more educated, more familiar with computer security, and more male 
than the general population”. Although the second study group saw a significant 
improvement in usability (after improvements made by the Tor Project), issues were still 
evident (although on a smaller scale) despite their familiarity with computer security. 
A further study by Renaud et al. (2014) on E2E email encryption identified seven 
fundamental states in terms of encryption and privacy enhancing tools:
 Lack of awareness of privacy as a concern.
 Awareness of possibility of privacy violation but don’t take action, maybe due to 
lack of concern.
 Aware of possible violation but not aware this can happen in transit or at the mail 
server side. They attempt to protect themselves, but not using E2E encryption.
 Aware but not see the need to act.
 They are aware of potential violations and wish to act, but they do not know how.
 They are concerned about privacy and understand E2E encryption prevents this, 
but they can’t do it.
 They are concerned and understand they can use E2E but they still have reasons 
not to (may get side-tracked or other reasons).
They found that “very few” of the participants mentioned the term encryption and many of 
those that did “seemed to have a wrong understanding of encryption and in particular E2E 
encryption”. There is, clearly, a lack of awareness of the technology, what it achieves and 
how it operates, which may lead to difficulties in distinguishing tools that provide strong 
protections from “snake-oil alternatives” which may leave them vulnerable (Sinclair Brody, 
2016). They also concluded that although usability may be an issue, this would only be the 
case for those who reach the stage of wishing to act. For many, privacy may be considered 
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secondary to the function individuals wish to perform (Sinclair Brody, 2016). For those who 
do not adopt such technologies, it is first necessary to overcome their lack of will or ability to
protect their intellectual privacy. For those that do reach the stage of using it, however, it is 
clear that E2E email encryption is “undeniably effortful” and harder to use than normal 
software (Renaud et al., 2014; Sinclair Brody, 2016; Whitten & Tygar, 1999).
Other tools to enable secure communications have also proved problematic. For example, 
Mailvelope, a PGP email client, was found to be difficult to use by the majority of 
participants in one study, with almost all participants unable to complete the required tasks 
(Ruoti et al., 2015). As a result of the study, Ruoti et al. argued that it is “unclear if PGP 
will ever be usable by the masses” concluding that “Johnny has still not gotten any closer to 
encrypt his email using PGP” (Ruoti et al., 2015). Furthermore, the use of IM protocols 
such as XMPP (formerly Jabber), in combination with Off-the-Record (OTR) encryption 
protocols to ensure end-to-end encryption, can be particularly arduous with a number of 
steps required before secure communications can be conducted (Lee, 2015a).
Although there are limitations in drawing out substantive conclusions from such studies, it is 
clear that as those who are described as “more educated” and “more familiar with computer 
security” experience difficulties, one can conclude that those who aren’t as educated or as 
familiar with computer security are as likely to experience difficulties, if not more so. 
Further research is, of course, needed to establish the extent to which the general population 
experience difficulties using technologies that protect their intellectual privacy. Furthermore, 
although those who are “computer savvy” may be familiar with privacy enhancing tools such 
as Tor, it is unclear to what extent the average member of the public is either aware of the 
technology or understands its value. As Renaud et al.’s study found, few of those that 
participated even mentioned encryption so one can reasonably expect that this lack of 
understanding of encryption technologies is fairly widespread, if not within the “computer 
savvy” community, then certainly across society generally. 
As well as skills, the ability to identify which tools are most effective at protecting the user is
also fundamental. Not all tools that claim to provide secure messaging provide a truly secure 
communications platform. Although there has been a proliferation of instant messaging tools
offering encrypted communications, it is arguable that many services ultimately seek to profit
from growing concerns about state and corporate surveillance.  Telegram, for example, 
despite running a competition encouraging individuals to test its encryption (Telegram, 
2014), has been decried as “error prone” and “leak[ing] voluminous metadata” (Cox, 2015; 
grugq, 2015a). In contrast, Signal (an open-source messaging tool) provides the “best 
encryption available” (grugq, 2015b). The ability to recognise which tools are most effective,
as well as having the skills to use encryption tools effectively, is fundamental to ensuring the 
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protection of intellectual privacy. It is, therefore, crucial for individuals to be aware of the 
appropriate tools to protect their intellectual privacy.
Furthermore, access to suitable hardware must also be considered. In one study comparing 
the two most popular operating systems in mobile devices (iOS and Android), it was found 
that iOS devices had a slight advantage over Android devices in terms of security (Ahmad et 
al., 2013). This is significant because devices running on the Android operating system tend 
to be cheaper than those running iOS (Price, 2015). Additionally, despite the enabling of 
encryption on the latest versions of both operating systems, the majority of Android users 
own devices that pre-date its adoption (Cunningham, 2015; Gibbs, 2015b). As Christopher 
Soghoian argues, Android devices may be relatively cheap, but they are also an easier target 
for intelligence agencies because they are less secure (Simonite, 2015). As a consequence, 
Soghoian argues that we “now find ourselves in not just a digital divide but a digital security 
divide”, not least because Google “gives away services for free in return for access to data” 
(Simonite, 2015). As with other aspects of the digital divide, financial limitations and lack of
skills exacerbate the post-Snowden intellectual privacy divide, limiting autonomy in our 
communications.
Although iOS devices are arguably more secure than their Android counterparts, they are 
not without their vulnerabilities. Intelligence agencies have, for example, been successful in 
infiltrating computers that individuals use to sync with their iOS devices (Zdziarski, 2014). 
Despite this limitation it is clear that, although there are vulnerabilities with both devices, 
iOS devices offer more security than their cheaper counterparts. This raises significant issues
as those who can afford to protect themselves are able to do so by investing in more 
expensive hardware. Those who cannot afford it are left with devices that are inferior in 
security terms and, consequently, more susceptible to state surveillance. 
The state of the digital divide in the UK
The most recent 'Internet Access – Households and Individuals' report by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) reflects the current state of the digital divide (ONS, 2015). The 
report reveals that only 35% of those surveyed have changed their internet browsing settings 
to prevent or limit cookies, despite 65% being aware that such cookies “can be used to trace 
movements of people, make a profile of each user and provide tailored ads”. The ONS also 
found that of those households without internet access (14%), 31% reported that the reason 
for a lack of access was due to a “lack of skills”, 14% indicated prohibitive equipment costs, 
and 12% access costs (ONS, 2015). 
Alongside the ONS report, Ofcom found that 64% of internet users use the same password 
for most or all websites, 26% do not read privacy statements at all (43% say they “skim-
read”), and 68% say that they are happy to provide personal information online “as long as 
Journal of Radical Librarianship, 2 (2016) pp.1–32
16
they get what they want” (Ofcom, 2015). Meanwhile, in a report published in 2014, the BBC
claimed that 1 in 5 adults lacked four basic online skills (send and receive emails, use a 
search engine, browse the internet, and fill out an online application form) (BBC Learning, 
2014).1 This was particularly stark amongst the most disadvantaged as 69% of those that 
lacked the basic skills defined were from C2DE households.2 
It is important to note, however, that the use of encryption technologies was problematic 
even for those described as “computer savvy”. Consequently, although it is vital to 
acknowledge that the most disadvantaged will be least likely to protect themselves (which is 
particularly crucial as this is the group most likely to be affected by surveillance 
technologies), lack of skills in using encryption technologies is not restricted only to those 
households identified as C2DE. The intellectual privacy divide cuts across all social 
groupings to varying degrees, but the consequences of this divide will be felt most starkly by 
those that are most disadvantaged.
Libraries and the intellectual privacy divide
Libraries have been fundamental in bridging the digital divide for the most disadvantaged in 
society, both in providing access and in supporting the development of basic skills. The 
People’s Network, for example, was a key government initiative that ensured public libraries 
played a central role in bridging the digital divide, facilitating access to the internet through 
the provision of accessible computer terminals available to the public (Big Lottery Fund, 
2004). A related initiative to provide staff training was “fundamental to the implementation” 
of the People’s Network – an acknowledgement that the provision of an internet connected 
terminal was insufficient without skilled support (King et al., 2006). 
As part of the rollout of this initiative, the New Opportunities Fund (NOF) financed an 
information communications technology (ICT) training programme for public library staff 
(Library and Information Commission, cited in Spacey, 2003). The training stipulated a 
number of outcomes including competence with ICT and using ICT to find information for 
users (Spacey, 2003). Spacey found that the majority of respondents were positive about 
helping the public use the internet. Around 51.5% of respondents claimed they felt 
“generally positive” about doing so, compared to 5.4% who felt generally negative and 2.6% 
who felt very negative. Spacey concludes that the NOF training helped to familiarise staff 
with ICT and provide them with the skills for effective use of the internet, particularly those 
1 A further report in 2015 was prepared by Ipsos MORI on behalf of Go ON UK that changed the four basic 
skills to five: managing information, communicating, transacting, creating and problem solving (Ipsos 
MORI, 2015). As the earlier report is more specific in terms of what it is measuring, that is the report that 
has been used here. In terms of the more recent report, Ipsos MORI found that 35% of C2DEs lack basic 
digital skills and 30% lack basic online skills.
2 C2: Skilled manual occupations, D: semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations, E: casual workers, 
non-working and pensioners
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with little or no ICT skills. However, no such training on online privacy was built into this 
package of training for library staff.
Since the roll out of the People’s Network, public libraries in the UK have been in steady 
decline with many closed or handed to volunteers to run. As a result, the support available 
for basic internet skills has been greatly diminished, with some volunteer-run libraries not 
able to provide the skilled support required, particularly in areas of high deprivation (Clark, 
2012). Consequently, public libraries have gradually been superseded as places to seek out 
support with the skills that are required to perform basic tasks online. Increasingly, private 
companies have stepped in to provide the support with online skills, effectively privatising 
the People’s Network. 
The Barclays Digital Eagles scheme, for example, offers a range of sessions designed to help 
people build their confidence using computers and the internet (Barclays, 2015). The support
offered includes help with email, internet search engines, and online shopping. Although they
offer some basic privacy advice (“beware of scam emails”) the series of guides produced by 
Barclays offer no guidance regarding privacy protection tools available online (Barclays, 
2015). The main services recommended by Barclays include Google (for search and email), 
Yahoo!, and Outlook.com – all of which have been either forced to hand over data to, or 
have had a relationship with, the NSA (Greenwald et al., 2013; Leopold, 2014; Rushe, 
2014). Additionally, Google uses browser history to serve adverts to Gmail accounts, 
potentially leading to Barclays adverts being delivered direct to the user following such a 
session (Clark, 2016; Google, 2015).
As well as helping to bridge the digital divide, public libraries have a fundamental role to 
play in terms of intellectual privacy. In 2005, the Chartered Institute for Library and 
Information Professionals (Cilip) produced a “Statement on intellectual freedom, access to 
information and censorship” (Cilip, 2005). Furthermore Cilip endorsed the Council of 
Europe's 'Public access to and freedom of expression in networked information: Guidelines 
for a European cultural policy' (Council of Europe, 2000). Cilip’s statement on intellectual 
freedom underlined Cilip’s ethical principles that professionals must show a “commitment to
the defence, and the advancement, of access to information, ideas and works of the 
imagination” (Cilip, 2012). The Council of Europe’s guidelines put forward a number of 
proposals advising that individuals are to “decide for themselves what they should, or should 
not, access” and that those providing the service should “respect the privacy of users and 
treat knowledge of what they have accessed or wish to access as confidential” (Council of 
Europe, 2000). Librarians should, therefore, do what is required to ensure that privacy of 
users is respected and treat their activities as confidential. In an environment of mass 
surveillance it is incumbent on librarians to take steps to protect the privacy of their users.
Further to these principles outlined by the Council of Europe and endorsed by Cilip, the 
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International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (Ifla) issued a statement in 
2015 reinforcing the importance of libraries as places that should ensure the privacy and 
freedom of individuals accessing information. Ifla’s 'Statement on Privacy in the Library 
Environment' made a number of recommendations including advising information 
professionals that they have a responsibility to “reject electronic surveillance”, provide 
training on “tools to use to protect their privacy” and “respect and advance privacy at the 
level of practices and as a principle” (Ifla, 2015). In terms of the guidance produced by 
Cilip, the Council of Europe, and Ifla, librarians in the UK have an obligation to defend the 
intellectual privacy of those that use the services they provide. 
Librarians in the US have been at the forefront in defending the intellectual privacy of 
library users, establishing many of the fundamentals of intellectual freedom and privacy 
(Richards, 2008). For example, the American Library Association’s (ALA) Bill of Rights, 
first adopted in 1939, asserts that libraries should “cooperate with all persons and groups 
concerned with resisting abridgment of free expression and free access to ideas” (ALA, 
1996). Furthermore, after 9/11, the ALA published an interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
arguing that libraries must preserve the “right to open enquiry without having the subject of 
one’s interest examined or scrutinised by others” and that rights to privacy are “necessary for
intellectual freedom and are fundamental to the ethics and practice of librarianship” 
(American Library Association, 2002).
Librarians tackling digital surveillance
Following the Snowden revelations in 2013, Alison Macrina established the Library 
Freedom Project in the US and began to visit public libraries across the country providing 
“privacy rights training”, particularly focusing on encryption technologies (Burns, 2015; 
Carpenter, 2015). In 2015, the Library Freedom Project established a Tor relay node in 
Kilton Library, New Hampshire (Macrina & Fatemi, 2015), the first such relay in a public 
library anywhere in the world. Tor relays essentially act as nodes “pass[ing] traffic between 
each other to make the three layers of anonymizing encryption possible”, and are crucial to 
the effectiveness of the service (Macrina, 2015). Despite efforts by Homeland Security 
leading to the suspension of the programme, the relay was eventually re-established (Doyle-
Burr, 2015; Dreyfuss, 2015). Furthermore, legislation has been proposed that would permit 
libraries to install and use cryptographic privacy software, including Tor (O’Neill, 2016). 
The establishment of a Tor relay in a public library in the US demonstrates that it is possible 
to ensure the privacy of library users in an environment of mass state surveillance, ensuring 
greater autonomy in their use of the internet.
In the US there have been increasing efforts to raise awareness of intellectual privacy issues. 
For example, the ALA announced sponsorship of “Let’s Encrypt”, a service provided by the 
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Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) that enables those who own a domain to obtain an 
SSL certificate for a web server at no cost, ensuring protection of web traffic (ALA Office 
for Intellectual Freedom, 2015). Furthermore, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
submitted an amicus brief representing groups such as the ALA challenging the NSA’s 
programme of mass surveillance in an effort to recognise the right to privacy of an 
individual’s reading choices (Crocker et al., 2015; Crocker, 2015).
One significant advantage in tackling violations of intellectual privacy in the United States is 
the US Constitution, in particular the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment. These 
constitutional rights provide a lever which librarians can use against the state to defend 
intellectual privacy. Such a lever has been successfully employed previously in the case of 
four Connecticut-based librarians who objected to the National Security Letter provision of 
the Patriot Act that enabled the FBI to demand patron library records (Lichtblau, 2005). The
four librarians successfully faced down the US government after refusing to turn over the 
requested records (Dobija, 2014). In contrast, the United Kingdom has no written 
constitution (and no equivalent to the First Amendment), and therefore an equivalent lever 
does not exist for library and information professionals. As a result, actions to defend civil 
liberties in opposition to the state are substantially more difficult. 
Furthermore, although public libraries in the United States receive federal funding, the 
federal government does not “superintend” the service to the same extent as the UK 
government (ALA, 2015). In the UK, the government has a duty to oversee the public 
library service and, where a local authority fails to perform its duties, the Minister for the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport has the power to intervene (Cilip, 2013). Such an 
intervention has a precedent following the decision to intervene in the proposals to close 
eleven libraries in the Wirral (Charteris, 2009; Harris, 2009). With such oversight from a 
government hostile to encryption technologies, it is hard to see how extensive efforts could 
be taken to teach the skills required for users to ensure their intellectual privacy through 
tools such as PGP and Tor Browser.
However, although the introduction of certain services and training on encryption 
technologies appears unlikely given the oversight by central government, there are non-
controversial tools that could be used and advocated in public libraries to protect intellectual 
privacy. For example, privacy orientated search engines such as DuckDuckGo rather than 
Google could be adopted as default search engines ensuring personal data is neither stored 
nor monetised (Farivar, 2012). Library websites (particularly the library catalogue) should 
utilise the HTTPS protocol by default to encrypt and protect traffic between the browser and 
the server, protecting intellectual privacy when searching the catalogue and ensuring 
confidentiality (Shema, 2011). The use of open-source alternatives to proprietary software 
would also be advantageous, particularly as such software can better protect privacy (Barron,
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2016; Sinclair Brody, 2016). Furthermore, defaulting to the use of open-source browsers 
such as Firefox and incorporating ad-blockers would help to remove vulnerabilities that can 
compromise user privacy (Lee, 2015b). A case for such measures to be taken in public 
libraries can and should be made as a first step towards ensuring the intellectual privacy of 
library users.
At present, in contrast to the efforts of library associations and librarians in the US, UK 
equivalents to the Library Freedom Project have not emerged and there are currently no 
efforts by Cilip comparable to those of the ALA. At present there are no training 
programmes for the general public to ensure the protection of intellectual privacy, despite 
Ifla’s recommendations (Ifla, 2015). However, there are groups emerging in the UK that do 
provide such training programmes (Brass Horn Communications, 2015). Despite this, in the 
current environment the delivery of such programmes in public libraries managed by local 
authorities seems unlikely. In terms of intellectual privacy, it appears at present that there are
more efforts to protect the rights of the individual in the home of the NSA than there are in 
the UK.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated some of the key issues concerning digital surveillance in the UK,
how its existence threatens civil liberties and intellectual freedom, and the ways in which 
individuals can protect themselves from state and corporate infringement of these values 
identifying the need to provide support to develop the skills necessary to do so. 
Recommendations are made relating to the role of public libraries in addressing this aspect 
of the digital divide and supporting citizens in resisting mass state and corporate 
surveillance.
Mass digital surveillance is a threat to intellectual privacy, autonomy of web use, and 
democracy itself. Its existence inhibits the formation of new ideas and the seeking out of 
alternatives to the status quo, limiting the ability to critique institutions and to develop and 
enhance democratic structures. The state may argue that it is necessary to protect individuals
from external threats, but it is also a means to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, 
corporate actors collect vast volumes of personal data that are then sold to create profit, a 
natural consequence of the commodification of information. These two forms of surveillance
are not distinct: they feed into each other, with corporate surveillance acting as state 
surveillance by proxy.
The emergence of tools to protect individuals from mass state and corporate surveillance is 
crucial in ensuring citizens are able to exercise autonomy in internet use. However, these 
tools require the individual to have a degree of social, economic, and cultural capital. The 
user must be able to use and identify the right tools to ensure their intellectual privacy. Given
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that many of the most disadvantaged in the UK lack basic online skills, it is clear that 
inequality in terms of autonomy of internet use is a serious concern in terms of digital 
inclusion, particularly as the UK government continues to aggressively pursue further 
surveillance powers.
In the US, there are ongoing efforts to ensure that individuals’ intellectual privacy is 
protected. Despite the aggressive pursuit of surveillance powers by the UK government, 
there are currently no such efforts in the UK to provide individuals with the tools to access 
information online freely and without fear of reprisals. This inaction is at odds with the 
stated principles of organisations such as Ifla and Cipfa who endorse the right for individuals 
to access information online confidentially. At present, this is not possible in the UK as the 
public library network does not ensure the privacy of those who use it, thus inhibiting 
intellectual privacy. The situation is exacerbated by the outsourcing of digital skills support 
to companies with a vested interest in not introducing individuals to encryption technologies 
because it will inhibit the companies' ability to generate profit.
However, there are feasible actions that could be taken now. Defaulting to privacy enhancing 
search engines such as DuckDuckGo would ensure the protection of the intellectual privacy 
of users, as would the incorporation of the HTTPS protocol on websites and the use of ad-
blockers on browsers. However, these are only first steps towards protecting the intellectual 
privacy of users. Efforts are already taking place in the UK to provide training on online 
privacy tools such as Tor Browser (Brass Horn Communications, 2015). Librarians should 
investigate the possibilities to work with such organisations to protect users, either within the
context of their working environment, or as professionals seeking to ensure the privacy of 
individuals more broadly. Consequently, librarians should commit to familiarising 
themselves with existing privacy enabling tools to ensure they can advocate for them and 
provide support in their use. They should also seek to work with open-source developers to 
deliver products that provide a better user experience, helping to “professionalize the 
practice of open-source development” (Sinclair Brody, 2016). As various professional 
organisations have stated the need to ensure intellectual privacy, there is a responsibility for 
library and information professionals in a post-Snowden environment to take steps to tackle 
this aspect of digital inequality. Librarians have played a key role in tackling digital 
inequality and must continue to work to eradicate such inequality, ensuring autonomy of 
internet use and supporting citizens in protecting themselves from mass state and corporate 
surveillance. 
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